Democracy at Stake: Self-Censorship as a Self-Defence Strategy for Journalists by Walulya, Gerald & Nassanga, Goretti L.
www.ssoar.info
Democracy at Stake: Self-Censorship as a Self-
Defence Strategy for Journalists
Walulya, Gerald; Nassanga, Goretti L.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Walulya, G., & Nassanga, G. L. (2020). Democracy at Stake: Self-Censorship as a Self-Defence Strategy for
Journalists. Media and Communication, 8(1), 5-14. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v8i1.2512
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 5–14
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v8i1.2512
Article
Democracy at Stake: Self-Censorship as a Self-Defence Strategy
for Journalists
Gerald Walulya * and Goretti L. Nassanga
Department of Journalism & Communication, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda; E-Mails: werald@gmail.com (G.W.),
gnassanga@gmail.com (G.L.N.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 30 September 2019 | Accepted: 30 December 2019 | Published: 25 February 2020
Abstract
Themedia play an essential role of informing andmobilising voters as well as facilitating a two-way communication process
between citizens and those vying for electoral offices during elections. This allows citizens to get information on various
issues from the contenders, which largely informs their electoral decisions. In most less democratic societies however,
this media function is increasingly becoming difficult to fulfil due to challenges journalists encounter during electoral pro-
cesses. Using Uganda’s last general elections in 2016 as a case study, this article discusses the safety of journalists during
elections basing on findings from a bigger study on the media coverage of the 2016 elections, supplemented by in-depth
interviews with 10 journalists who covered the elections. In addition, the analysis makes reference to the 2016 Uganda
Press Freedom Index. Findings of this research show that journalists face more safety and security risks during elections
particularly perpetuated by state security agencies. Compared to previous elections, the 2016 elections also recorded
the highest number of victims who were female journalists. This article highlights key challenges journalists face during
elections, which include: state harassment and intimidation, arrest of those considered critical to the state, and denial of
access to important information. Due to concerns of their own safety, journalists have responded to the insecure work en-
vironment by engaging in self-censorship, thereby giving biased or limited information to the public. The article identifies
gaps that media development agencies can help to close if the media are to play their rightful role in a democratic society,
especially during the electoral process.
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1. Introduction
The ‘responsibility to protect’ and ‘the responsibility
to report,’ profoundly implicate journalists in the prac-
tice of their craft and the conduct of civil societies
around the world. They should be seen as indivisible,
mutually constitutive, and implicate us all in the con-
duct and safeguarding of journalists. The protection
of journalists and their responsibility to report in and
from dangerous places, in violent times, cannot there-
fore be simply seen as amatter to do with ‘journalists’
or, even more broadly, as simply being about ‘journal-
ism.’ Ultimately it is a matter for all of us, as it reaches
deep inside the conduct of human affairs in global so-
ciety. (Cottle, 2017, p. 29)
The above statement gives the context within which this
article is premised. The safety of journalists as they carry
out their ‘responsibility to report’ is no longer a con-
cern of individual nation states, but is now a global con-
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cern, whereby the international community is obliged to
come to the defence of journalists’ safety, thus warrant-
ing evoking the global ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P)
journalists. The commitment of states to free speech and
press freedom has been found deficient and the verdict
according to Sarikakis (2017) is that “states have failed
to provide for the consistent and systematic protective
measures for journalists” (p. 119). This failure can partly
account for the increase in numbers of journalists killed
every year, especially in wars and conflicts (Cottle, 2017;
Orgeret, 2016b, 2016c; UNESCO, 2018a). The global
trends and endemic conflicts have contributed to posi-
tioning journalists at increased risk and in harm’s way
(Cottle, 2017). Although there are a few safe havens,
Sarikakis (2017) observes that even in stable democra-
cies, journalists remain vulnerable and conditions for
journalism and free expression can deteriorate surpris-
ingly fast.
The principle of the R2P was originally meant to
be protection of citizens against genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, taken
as a responsibility of the state, with the international
community intervening if the state failed. However, this
has expanded to the R2P potential victims to mass
atrocities and people suffering from avoidable catastro-
phe (Bellamy, 2010; Global Centre for the R2P, 2015;
International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, 2001). Due to the increasing number of jour-
nalists facing security and safety threats, this has war-
ranted evoking the R2P beyond individual states to the
international community.
Mirza (2009) rightly points out that although there
is little evidence that supports the existence of a global
public sphere, there is no question that globalising
trends are made possible with the help of media at
both the domestic and international level. Thus, it is
difficult to de-link R2P journalists as a local state man-
date to the responsibility of the international commu-
nity. Indeed, organizations like UNESCO, Reporters Sans
Frontiers, Committee for the Protection of Journalists,
International Crisis Group, and others, have been actively
engaged in advancing initiatives for the security and pro-
tection of journalists globally. The situation is particu-
larly delicate where journalists have to report from con-
flict or war zones. The fact that journalists are often per-
secuted, threatened or harmed during conflicts, affects
their ability to report freely (Frere, 2011; Orgeret, 2016a).
There is a trend of increased use of second-hand informa-
tion through wire services, which information is some-
times difficult to interpret to be relevant to local audi-
ences (Høiby & Ottosen, 2016). When considering safety
of journalists, the mind often ponders about killings. As
Torsner (2017) explains, while the killings of journalists
can be described as the most serious manifestation of
danger, there exists a whole range of different types of
risks that impact the safety of journalists. These risks of-
ten relate to the nature of certain forms of journalism—
such as critique of vested interests or views, exposure
of corruption, or reporting on conflict that they may be-
come targets of attack.
Emphasising the vital rolemedia play, Ronning (2016)
contends that “there is no doubt that the press plays a
critical role in all societies, particularly in defending and
promoting democracy and citizens’ right to be informed
and to debate” (p. 44). Apart frommedia providing infor-
mation to citizens, another key core societal role is “to
discover illegal actions and protect people from corrup-
tion through their watchdog function” (Orgeret, 2016a,
p. 15). Sincewe getmost of our information andwhatwe
know from the media, including social media, the jour-
nalists who are largely responsible for the media output,
have a key role to play in any society.
The right to access information presupposes that
journalists operate in a conducive safe environment,
where they can provide citizens with relevant informa-
tion that enables them to make informed decisions.
However, journalists often face challenges and leave out
certain information that can pose security and safety
threats to them.
Nohrstedt (2016) regrets that the challenges faced by
journalists in war and conflict zones are not problema-
tised by mainstream media, so the general public is un-
informed about the risks to freedom of information and
concludes that “from a democratic point of view, this is a
very dangerous situation” (p. 163), or what he terms as a
“muted democracy.” Echoing the same fears, a UNESCO
(2018a) report observes that “imprisonment of journal-
ists for their legitimate work not only fosters a culture of
self-censorship but also impinges on the broader rights
of society to obtain information” (p. 148). Of particular
interest in this article is the period of elections. During
this time, the media and journalists are supposed to pro-
vide a platform for contenders to reach the electorate. In
the same way, through the media, the electorate receive
information from contenders, which the voters base on
to make their electoral decisions.
The purpose of this article is to examine the safety
of journalists in the course of their work in Uganda, giv-
ing special focus to the time of elections. During the
pre-election campaigns, at election time and immediate
post-election period, there is much tension due to con-
testation of power as stakes are high, with various con-
tenders trying to win elective positions in government.
Sparks (2011) views media as valuable assets and argues
that winning political power allows a person to influence
the stories covered and the way they are covered. He
states that this can be exemplified by the high degree
of media politicisation in many countries that is a re-
flection of the belief that control of the media improves
chances of holding onto political power, given media’s
utility especially in competitive struggles, be they eco-
nomic or political.
For this article, we consider a political struggle with
the analysis based on a bigger study on election cover-
age in East Africa, using the 2016 Uganda elections as
a case study. Media being the major channel through
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which people within the country and beyond get to
knowwhat is happening during election time, it is impor-
tant to analyse and document the kind of work environ-
ment that journalists operate in, as relates to their safety
and security.
To put the analysis into perspective, the article first
gives an overview of the broader global picture on the
safety of journalists.
2. Safety and Security of Journalists at the Global Level
When examining the R2P journalists by the international
community, it is important to recognise the changed
media landscape and the concepts of both ‘interdepen-
dence’ and ‘globalisation,’ which have promoted geo-
graphical closeness or cultural proximity that has facili-
tated media to cross borders to create global media sys-
tems (Mirza, 2009). This implies that the safety of jour-
nalists has to be considered at the local, regional, and
the global levels.
Generally, the security and safety threats to journal-
ists have had a negative impact on the way newsrooms
operate. In their investigation on security of journalists,
Høiby and Ottosen (2016) found that editors were re-
luctant to send reporters to conflict zones or on “high-
risk assignments in regions affected by political tension”
(p. 190), and when they did, they kept them out for
a short time, meaning there were fewer first hand ob-
servations. They argue that this led to degraded qual-
ity and quantity of information from wars and conflict
areas, which impacted society at the local and interna-
tional level. Ntulume (2016) echoes similar observations
after her analysis of the Ugandan army intervention in
the South Sudan conflict, where she finds that most of
the news coverage was a reproduction of the leadership
standpoint, with few challenging voices explaining that
“journalists seemed to tread carefully appearing to pre-
fer to run with information officials provided, than nav-
igate uncertain territory” (p. 58). The same experience
is shared by Skjerdal (2013) after his study of journalism
practice in Ethiopia, where he found that there was a cul-
ture of self-censorship and discourses of fear in the news-
rooms with journalists producing and reproducing a sub-
servient reporting style. These observations tally with
those of Sparks (2011), who concludes after his study
on South African media that media were very far from
the ideal of neutral and objective journalism. However,
most times these imbalances are brought about by fac-
tors beyond the journalists’ control, having more to do
with the work environment they operate in. In this arti-
cle, we explore the different threats to journalists’ safety
in the course of performing their work professionally.
UNESCO is one of the agencies working towards en-
hancing press freedom and they are regularly engaged in
monitoring the media as part of assessing developments
in the media industry worldwide. In a recent world re-
port that assessed among others, the physical, psycho-
logical, and digital safety of journalists, it was noted that
“trends remain extremely alarming” (UNESCO, 2018a,
p. 137). The report cites the case of 530 journalists who
were killed, with an average of two deaths per week be-
tween 2012 and 2016. In addition, the report points out
the high levels of impunity for crimes against journal-
ists, with only 10% of the 930 cases of death of journal-
ists between 2006–2016 being resolved, which means
that it was only in these cases where the perpetrators
of the crimes were brought to justice by a court of law.
Out of 930 cases that were registered, 33% were on-
going or unresolved. In at least 55% of the cases, there
was no information on judicial follow-up of investigations
(UNESCO, 2018a). Comparatively, Western Europe and
North America experienced a lesser degree of impunity
with 50% of the cases resolved, Africa had only 13% of
cases resolved, whereas the Arab states had the highest
level of impunity with only 2% of cases resolved. This im-
plies that there are still high levels of impunity of crimes
against journalists in most developing countries as most
of the cases either remain unresolved/ongoing or there
is no information on their judicial process.
3. Work Environment for Journalists in Uganda
Article 29 of the Ugandan Constitution generally guar-
antees the right to freedom of the media and expres-
sion. However, several studies show that the work en-
vironment for journalists in Uganda is very restrictive,
with journalists facing threats of violence, harassment,
intimidation, imprisonment, kidnap, and even death
(Foundation for Human Right Initiative [FHRI], 2016;
Human Rights Watch, 2016; Ssenoga, 2018; UNESCO,
2018b). These various forms of risk to the safety of jour-
nalists do not only limit access to information for citizens
but it has “a chilling effect on the ability of Ugandans
to critique the president and the government’s policies
or freely debate critical issues, such as governance and
corruption” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p. 42). The vio-
lence can be viewed as part of an ongoing and system-
atic form of censorship designed to stifle freedom of the
press in Uganda (Ssenoga, 2018).
From one radio station (Radio Uganda) and one TV
station (UTV) in the 1960s, Uganda has 292 licensed ra-
dio stations spread country-wide and 33 operational tele-
vision stations, mainly in the capital Kampala (Uganda
Communications Commission, 2018). With this multiplic-
ity of broadcast stations, one can easily miss-construe
this as indicative of a flourishing democracy since citi-
zens ideally would have exposure to more media outlets
and better information access. However, this is not the
case for Uganda, as was noted in a 2016 pre-election re-
port by Human Rights Watch (2016). The report noted
that freedom of the press in Uganda was deceptive
explaining that while print journalists in the country’s
capital, Kampala, may enjoy some relative degree of
freedom, journalists outside Kampala—particularly radio
journalists upcountry broadcasting in local languages—
face challenges often in freely reporting on issues seem-
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ingly sensitive to the ruling party. The report further
noted that it was common for journalists and station
managers to face threats of suspension or dismissal for
providing the opposition with a platform, while radio sta-
tions faced the threat of closure. Such threats to journal-
ists tend to entrench the culture of self-censorship.
Like the previous regimes, the current government
has reacted towards what is deemed as hostile or sub-
versive media coverage the same way as the colonial ad-
ministration that tolerated no criticisms (Bichachi, 2013).
All this done under the pretext of having a “controlled
Press as a necessity to preserve national security and
unity” (Sekeba, 2016, p. 147). A challenge that journal-
ists face sometimes is the dual loyalty between the pro-
fessional demands and calls for nationalism or loyalty to
the nation. Skjerdal (2013) describes this situation as hav-
ing competing loyalties, but points out that these are not
static but are more often shifting loyalties that involve
dilemmas when dealing with issues considered sensitive,
leading to self-censorship.
In a survey that among others assessedUgandan jour-
nalists’ perception of their work environment, 77% re-
spondents revealed that they were intensely harassed
and 23% said they were not. The survey also showed
thatmost journalists faced these security risks relating to
their work personally as their media houses often don’t
have policies to address them. For 80% of the journalists,
their media houses had no policies for safety, while only
20% had some policies (UNESCO, 2018b). Due to fear
for their personal safety, journalists have taken on self-
censorship, rather than to risk the wrath of government
and security agencies if reporting on issues considered
‘sensitive.’ As noted by Ssenoga (2018), journalists in
Uganda have borne the brunt of censorship for decades.
The harassment and violence are not only experi-
enced by local journalists but also by foreign correspon-
dents. One such incident was when a Reuters photojour-
nalist, James Akena, who was covering demonstrations
demanding for the release of Robert Kyagulanyi (also
known as Bobi Wine), a member of the Ugandan par-
liament and a musician, was beaten, and the video of
his beating went viral on social media. President Yoweri
Museveni, “tried to explain away the attack saying that
it was a case of mistaken identity that the journalist had
been mistaken for a camera thief” (Ssenoga, 2018).
It has been noted that while journalists operate un-
der threats daily, the fear to express oneself freely is
more pertinent during periods of political contestation
or controversy, and restrictions and threats are more
pronounced during this time (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung &
fesmedia Africa, 2016). When considering the safety of
journalists, particular focus is made to journalists cover-
ing conflicts of various dimensions includingwars, armed
conflict, situations of political instability, riots, demon-
strations, crisis or tension situations, and election peri-
ods. This is a genuine concern as Orgeret (2016c) reveals
in her study on challenges of war and conflict coverage.
She notes that an increasing number of journalists world-
wide have encountered violent aggression while cover-
ing civil unrest and demonstrations and some have been
killed in the process, which has resulted in an increase of
coverage gaps and a growing culture of self-censorship
within the media and society. Høiby and Ottosen (2016)
came up with similar findings in their study, observing
that the security situation for reporters in conflict zones
had deteriorated greatly. The duo concludes that “it is
evident that there is a close link between lack of secu-
rity and self-censorship” (Høiby &Ottosen, 2016, p. 183),
adding that the increasing problem of impunity has an
impact on freedom of expression on a global scale.
Another area of particular concern for the safety of
journalists is during investigative reporting. Often times,
the people being investigated are influential individuals
in government, holding leadership positions in society or
with big businesses. These types of people sometimes
threaten journalists who try to expose them in themedia.
Criminal networks are prepared to use extreme violence
to contain and control public information and investiga-
tions that threaten their interests. Sometimes journalists
become targets or indirect victims when seeking to re-
port on such injustices (Cottle, 2017). A case in point is an
investigative journalist, Solomon Serwanjja, who was do-
ing an investigative story for NBS Television on big shots
sellingmedical drugs thatwere supposed to be free to pa-
tients in government hospitals.Whenword leaked about
the story, a hunt started for him. After failing to trace his
whereabouts, police picked his wife from their home and
the journalist had to come out of hiding before his wife
could be released (Yiga, 2019). This demonstrates how
threats may go beyond the journalists and affect their
families too.
Similar to what takes place in other countries where
violence is meted out to both male and female jour-
nalists, female journalists in Uganda also experience
another dimension of this through sexual harassment,
which discourages upcoming female journalists. In ad-
dition, female journalists are more exposed in conflict
settings that are usually dominated by men and this
makes them more vulnerable (Orgeret, 2016a). While
there are slightly more females than males in the jour-
nalism training institutions in Uganda, the newsrooms
are male dominated and journalism is still seen as a
‘masculine’ job. A study by the Uganda Media Women
Association that assessed women’s participation in the
print media found that only an average 20% women are
involved in print media journalism (World Association
for Christian Communication, & UgandaMediaWomen’s
Association, 2015).
A challenge to women covering conflict or wars that
Orgeret (2016b, 2016c) identified was the need to have
an awareness of cultural norms and practices especially
when it comes to how to deal with sources in the field,
who would perceive the journalist in her professional ca-
pacity and as a woman. The female journalists she in-
terviewed said that they had to develop a situational
awareness to be able to recognise certain conversations
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deemed inappropriate and sometimes eye contact that
could be construed as flirting. These experiencesmaynot
apply to the male journalists.
In the next section we present the methodology ap-
plied to collect data used in this article followed by the
findings of the study.
4. Methodology
The analysis in this article is based on findings from a
bigger research project that assessed the press coverage
of elections in East Africa’s one-party dominant states
of Uganda and Tanzania. (Walulya, 2018). In addition to
the primary data from the field research, the article sup-
plements this with findings from the 2016 Uganda Press
Freedom Index produced by the Human Rights Network
for Journalists—Uganda (HRNJ-U). Findings from the
above two sources were further supplemented by key in-
formant interviews with a purposively selected sample
of 10 journalists, who covered the 2016 elections, out of
about 60 journalists who reported on the elections. We
chose only 10 journalists because we wanted to extract
in-depth narratives from these journalists. Moreover,
this was in addition to data from a bigger study that also
involved interviewing all categories of journalists who
covered elections. Of the 10 journalists, five were broad-
cast journalists while five were print journalists. Seven
of the 10 journalists were male while three were female.
This is because Uganda has more male than female jour-
nalists, especially the ones covering politics. The exact
number of journalists in Uganda is not known because
of lack of an umbrella organisation that can register jour-
nalists across the country, but conservative estimates
put the number at around 1,000. This study targeted
only journalists who covered the 2016 elections on a
regular basis rather than those who wrote one-off sto-
ries about elections. This was aimed at getting journal-
ists with a wealth of experience in reporting elections.
To identify these journalists, we conducted a content
analysis of newspapers and reviewed radio and TV news-
casts that happened during elections to ascertain who
the reporters were. In cases where it was not easy to ver-
ify which reporters had reported certain stories, editors
guided us to the right reporters. The selected journalists
belonged to both the state-owned media and privately
owned media houses.
We used a semi-structured interview guide to ask the
journalists about their experiences during the coverage
of elections. On the basis of responses we received from
the interviewees, we often probed whenever points of
interest were mentioned. All interviews were conducted
at the journalists’ places of work for purposes of conve-
nience. Interviews lasted between 15 to 38 minutes de-
pending on howmuch information the sources were will-
ing to share with us. Due to the sensitivity of issues our
sources discussed with us, we agreed that we shall not
make specific descriptions that may lead to their iden-
tification as this could culminate into reprisals such as
dismissals. Interviews were transcribed and analysed to
identify the themes that emerged.
The HRNJ-U Press Index Report that was used to sup-
plement the qualitative data was compiled basing on re-
ports HRNJ-U received from journalists during 2016 plus
cases of media freedom violations that were reported
in the media. Other information of unreported cases
was acquired through interviewing journalists in differ-
ent newsrooms, both print and electronic across the
country. It should be noted that although the election
campaign period takes approximately 90 days in Uganda,
the compilation of this report is based on events of a full
calendar year. This is because election activities are not
only restricted to the official campaign period. The ex-
tended period helped in capturing media freedom viola-
tion incidents before, during, and shortly after elections.
5. Findings
5.1. Forms of Media Freedom Violations during Elections
During the 2016 election year, HRNJ-U recorded 135
cases of infringement on the right of journalists to re-
port. Most of these cases were assault on journalists by
both state and non-state actors (HRNJ-U, 2016). Due to
the severity of the nature of assaults, some victims had
to stay away from work as they nursed the wounds occa-
sioned on them. Unfortunately, many of the journalists
in Uganda are freelancers and have nomedical insurance.
This means that in crisis situations like these, they are un-
able to work and sometimes they are also unable to take
care of their medical bills.
It is important to note that assault of journalists is
not only done by the state security agencies. In a charged
election atmosphere, some ordinary citizens also assault
journalists they regard as ‘biased’ against their candidate.
For example, in the middle of the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections campaigns on 22December 2015, sup-
porters of Jacob Oulanyah, the deputy speaker of parlia-
ment, beat up journalists covering opposition presiden-
tial candidate Kizza Besigye (FHRI, 2016). Other forms
of violation of media freedom include malicious arrest
and detention of journalists on trumped up charges.
Journalists were arrested whenever the police and the
army found them covering what is deemed as sensi-
tive issues. One such arrest happened in February 2016
shortly after the winner of the 2016 elections was an-
nounced. A female TV reporter, Bahati Remmy, was ar-
rested while reporting live on air. The arrest happened
near the home of the leading opposition candidate, Kizza
Besigye, who was then under house arrest, as the re-
porter further explains:
Journalism is not a crime. It’s a public good. Our only
crime is, we have the courage to tell stories the way
they are…As you can see, we have been arrested by
police and they are taking us away to an unknown des-
tination. (HRNJ-U, 2016, p. 44)
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Sometimes journalists face more than one form of free-
dom violation. They are sometimes arrested and at the
same time assaulted during and after arrest, as the same
journalist further narrated.
I was covering a story at the home of Besigye, when
police arrested and detained me at Kasangati police
station. While in the police van, I was beaten and
my hair was pulled by police officers inside the van.
My cameraman Badebye Godfrey was also hit on the
head and he is in severe pain. I was treated in a very
inhumane way, even when I surrendered, the police-
men kept pushing me around. (HRNJ-U, 2016, p. 44)
The above case is not an isolated incident because
many more journalists were arrested mainly by police in
other incidents. For example, NTV cameraman Abubaker
Zirabamuzaale and reporter Suhail Mugabi were thrown
onto a waiting police van while other remaining journal-
ists like Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjogi of Daily Monitor and
Abubaker Lubowa were harassed by police while waiting
to cover a meeting between two opposition candidates
(FHRI, 2016). Other journalists who were arrested while
covering elections include two BBC journalists who were
arrested while filming Abim Hospital in North Eastern
Uganda, which was then in the spotlight for its dilapi-
dated state after a visit by an opposition candidate Kizza
Besigye. The two journalists were later released without
any charge (The Observer, 2016).
Another common form of media freedom violation
that happens during elections is denial of access to in-
formation or news sources. During election campaigns,
security officers sometimes screen journalists and deny
access to those they consider to be reporting about the
candidate in a critical manner as one journalist explains:
I wrote a story documenting all the times that the
president [Yoweri Museveni] had campaigned past
6pm, which was the time that the electoral commis-
sion guidelines set for all campaigns to end.When the
story was published, the next day I was told to leave
the president’s campaign trail under the pretext that
they no longer had slots in their convoy for some of us.
(Personal communication, Reporter A, April 10, 2019)
Apart from this incident, NTV journalists were also de-
nied access to incumbent Yoweri Museveni rallies for re-
fusing to use campaign video footage produced by the
candidate’s media team in their news bulletins. In other
cases, candidates incited the public against some media
houses by alleging that they were biased against them.
For example, in the middle of the 2016 campaigns, re-
porters who were covering opposition candidate Kizza
Besigye from the government owned New Vision news-
paper, told us during interviews that they were forced
to remove the newspaper company name and branded
materials from the vehicle they were travelling in for fear
of being attacked bymobs loyal to the candidate. This fol-
lowed constant claims by the candidate that this newspa-
per and its subsidiaries were negatively reporting about
him. The candidate had also asked his supporters to boy-
cott buying New Visionmedia products.
Another common form of media freedom violation
during election periods, is themalicious damage, stealing
and confiscation of journalists’ working tools. This nor-
mally takes place during scuffles and arrests of journalists.
When a journalist is found taking pictures or filming inci-
dents, the police can break the camera using the same
clubs they use to assault journalists. In some cases they
can confiscate cameras as crime evidences but journalists
sometimes never get back their equipment again. There
are also cases when the security compels journalists to
delete pictures and videos that capture security forces
violating the rights of people during elections. There
have also been suspicious robberies at hotels where jour-
nalists stay during election campaigns. Some leads into
these robberies have indicated that they could be mo-
tivated by the desire to stop journalists from working
rather than the need to take the equipment for other use.
5.2. Perpetrators of Media Freedom Violations
As indicated in the above section, in Uganda, the police
that should be charged with protecting journalists is at
the same time the leading violator of the rights of jour-
nalists. As Table 1 indicates, 61% of all incidents of media
freedom violation recorded in 2016 were committed by
the police. Themajority of these cases were the rampant
arrests and assault of journalists. The main reason why
the police interfere with the work of journalists, espe-
cially during elections is because journalists expose the
police’s biased tendencies by protecting supporters of
the incumbent presidential candidate while suppressing,
assaulting, and dispersing opposition supporters.
Another major source of media freedom violation
during elections are the members of the public (commu-
nity) accounting for 17% of all cases reported in 2016.
During an election year, attacks on journalists by ordi-
nary people tend to escalate due to the emotions and
tension that run high during election periods.Most of the
assaults by the public against journalists have happened
during scuffles. These assaults are normally a product of
accusations of biases against a particular section of jour-
nalists. As mentioned earlier, some of these acts have
taken place after candidates inciting the public against
some sections of the media. A worrying trend in Uganda
is that during every election, leading political parties as-
semble some form of militias (paramilitary groups) that
sometimes descend on journalists and other people be-
lieved to be opposing their candidate to assault them
(Mwanje, 2010)
5.3. Self-Censorship during Elections
On the basis of the above-mentioned forms and sources
of media freedom violations, many journalists have re-
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Table 1. Perpetrators of media freedom violations.
Perpetrator Type of actor No. of violations reported Percentage
1. Uganda Police Force State 83 61%
2. Community members Non state 24 17%
3. Employer/Radio management Non state 8 6%
4. Members of parliament Quasi state 5 3.7%
5. Judiciary State 3 2.2%
6. Private security guards Non state 3 2.2%
7. Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces State 2 1.5%
8. Resident District Commissioners State 3 2.2%
9. Political party (NRM) Quasi state 2 1.5%
10. Local Council members State 1 0.7%
11. Uganda Prison Services State 1 0.7%
TOTAL 135 100%
Source: HRNJ-U (2016).
sorted to self-censorship as a strategy to stay safe
while covering elections. One of the major causes of
self-censorship among journalists covering elections in
Uganda is the practice of embedding with candidates.
The main presidential candidates normally hire press
vans that carry journalists that travel alongside the can-
didate. Because of this proximity, the journalists’ pro-
fessional judgment sometimes gets corrupted as one re-
porter explains:
I have found that sometimes when journalists are em-
bedded with candidates for a long time, they begin to
behave as if they are an extension of the candidate’s
campaign machinery, which sometimes leads to self-
censorship. One person with whom I reported on the
Besigye campaign in 2015–2016 eventually ended up
becoming his personal assistant. Others with whom
I reported on Museveni’s campaign either became
RDCs [Resident District Commissioners], official State
House photographers, or media and communications
assistants at the president’s office. (Personal commu-
nication, Reporter B, April 10, 2019)
The above view was shared by another journalist who
noted that when you are embedded with President
Museveni’s campaign team, you are given instructions on
what you have to do and if you do not comply with the
instructions, they drop you off the campaign trail. One of
such instructions is that you must portray the president
in a positive light byway of indicating in the story and the
pictures that the candidate drew huge crowds wherever
he went to campaign.
There are stories you come across but you cannot
write them. For example, one time the President’s
car knocked a child dead but no journalist wrote that
story because it was dangerous. In another incident,
President’s motorcade knocked three people dead
but still no one ran that story. Even if I had written
that story, it would still not come out because I work
for a newspaper partly owned by the government.
(Personal communication, Reporter C, April 15, 2019)
In other cases, journalists self-censor information con-
cerningmatters such as police and army brutality against
civilians and bribing of voters because they are embed-
ded with candidates. Other information that may be cen-
sored by journalists include off-the-record conversations
that you are unlikely to refer to while doing your stories
because the source did not authorise you to use the in-
formation. If you go ahead and use that information nev-
ertheless, you are likely to lose access to more insider in-
formation at a later stage of the campaign process. The
campaign teams also use access to their candidate as a
weapon to kill certain stories. Journalists who are more
objective are denied access to the candidate until they
‘shape up’ while those who tow the party line can inter-
view the candidate as and when they wish.
As evident in the above analysis, both journalists
working for government-owned media and those from
private media face challenges when it comes to report-
ing the truth. Government-owned media houses are ex-
pected to write stories that glorify the incumbent pres-
ident. Reporters have to relay what the president says
in campaigns no matter whether it is the same promise
he has made in the last three elections as another re-
porter explains:
The [media owner’s] influence is big because you
don’t have free latitude to write what you may have
wanted because you know that if you took a cer-
tain angle, it [the story] would not run; they would
even tell you to change it. There is one time I was in
AruawhenBesigye said thatMuseveni had turned this
country into a family project and I finished writing the
story. When it reached New Vision newsroom, they
called me and directed, “change the angle.” (Personal
communication, Reporter D, April 20, 2016)
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The other major cause of self-censorship relates to the
economic survival ofmedia houses. During elections,ma-
jor presidential and parliamentary candidates advertise
withmedia houses. These advertisements become an un-
written contract between the candidate and the media
house against critical stories. Government bodies that
are usually the biggest advertisers tend to spend a lot of
money around this time especially in supplements that
show what the incumbent has accomplished. This is in-
tended to solicit favourable coverage for the incumbent:
In many cases candidates that advertise with the me-
dia are given glowing coverage and are less scruti-
nised. This, in my view is a form of self-censorship.
Secondly institutions like Electoral Commission that
manage elections also spend a lot of money on ad-
vertisement, therefore insulating themselves against
critical coverage. I remember during the 2011 cam-
paigns, theministry of Public Service gave our newspa-
per a one-off advert worth about 120 million shillings
[$32,000]. They insisted that a lead story [related
to the advert] be written. The newspaper manage-
ment complied. (Personal communication, Reporter E,
April 15, 2019).
6. Conclusion: Implications of Self-Censorship on the
Credibility of Journalism and Democracy
The restrictive working environment for journalists in
Uganda has serious consequences for the growth and rel-
evancy of journalism to society aswell as democratic rule.
The profession continues to be unattractive tomany jour-
nalists and aspiring journalists partly because of lack of
freedom to report. As a result, more experienced journal-
ists continue to leave the profession in search of greener
pastures in NGOs and government agencies.
The continued self-censorship of election news
means that citizens go to vote on the basis of biased in-
formation. In terms of democracy, this presents a worri-
some situation when you have a media system that can-
not hold leaders accountable. As Frere (2011, p. 246) has
noted, if journalists are not free to report, neither can the
electoral process be viewed as free. The infringement on
the right to report remains a stumbling block in the way
of citizens’ right to access information and an obstacle
to free and fair elections. Journalists require access to
important information to adequately perform the watch-
dog function.
The harassment of journalists and preventing them
from accessing some news sources as well as commer-
cial considerations narrow their reporting scope, even-
tually leading to unbalanced information as a result of
self-censorship. Due to threats and violence highlighted
in this article, a sense of fear continues to engulf the me-
dia sector that causes reporters to tread with caution.
For a country to enjoy ranking among those with
democratic rule, it is not enough to claimobservance and
respect for press freedom, but these must be seen to
be actively guarded. This extends to journalists’ safety,
which is taken as a pre-condition for free expression and
freemedia (Orgeret, 2016c) and “limiting the principle of
free expression in all media is tantamount to undermin-
ing democracy” (Ronning, 2016, p. 43). In Uganda, there
tends to be more of lip-service to this than actual visi-
ble commitment. Speaking from his experience as a for-
merManaging Editor of SundayMonitor, Bichachi (2013),
points out that although the state in Uganda might ap-
pear ambivalent many times, ultimately it remains one
of the biggest challenge to media freedom. He argues
that although the National Resistance Movement gov-
ernment may not appear outright hostile to the media
like the previous regimes, the paranoia over the media
has not been any less. So as Ronning (2016) reasons, the
claim that one feels offended by somemedia is not a rea-
son to limit tolerance or free speech arguing that “to limit
this fundamental right is to undermine the very principle
of democracy” (p. 50). Thus, for countries like Uganda
that do not ensure safety of journalists, one can posit
that democracy is at stake.
While all citizens are entitled to enjoy their freedoms,
there is particular concern for journalists because of their
unique functions they perform in society. Once the free-
dom of journalists is violated, then freedoms of society
have also been violated. If journalists’ access to informa-
tion is restricted, then it is all society that suffers since
they are deprived of getting the information they need
to make informed decisions. Although national govern-
ments are expected to ensure a conducive work environ-
ment for journalists, due to working in a globalised me-
dia environment, the international community is also ex-
pected to carry out the R2P journalists globally.
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